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THE PARABLE AS LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 
G. Edward White* 
Two JEWISH JUSTICES: OUTCASTS IN THE PROMISED LAND. By 
Robert Burt. Berkeley: University of California Press. 1988. Pp. 165. 
$19.95. 
In this decade of theoretical and interdisciplinary scholarship, it is 
not unusual to find law professors writing on subjects not traditionally 
regarded as "legal," or expressing themselves in significantly different 
modes from those characteristically employed by earlier generations. 
It is therefore hardly startling, given the current tendencies of legal 
scholarship, to note that Robert Burt has written a book whose em-
phasis is far more on history, sociology, and psychology than on legal 
doctrine, and whose orientation is far more towards speculative theory 
than conventional legal analytics. And yet Burt's book, Two Jewish 
Justices, can be seen as unusual even in the scholarly universe in which 
it appears. In Two Jewish Justices Burt has pushed the wide-ranging 
speculative orientation of current scholarship one step further. He has 
written an extended parable: a work that, while making use of the 
conventional trappings of scholarship, simultaneously tests the ortho-
dox limits of that term. · 
I 
Parables are highly personal stories, told by a storyteller who in-
tends the stories to impart a piece of wisdom to the audience. The 
question any parable necessarily raises is whether those to whom it is 
addressed should accept the wisdom that it offers as truth, and, implic-
itly, regard the storyteller as wise. Burt is aware of this: he believes 
that the "theme" of his parable "casts some light on the contemporary 
status of all Americans" and provides "an intensified illumination of 
the truth" (p. 4). 
But on what is this hope based? Here one confronts the peculiar 
status of the parable when presented as legal scholarship. At times in 
Two Jewish Justices, Burt seems to be making quite a modest scholarly 
claim. He admits that his story of the lives of two prominent Supreme 
Court justices, Louis Brandeis and Felix Frankfurter, is "speculative 
and selective in its emphasis," and while he believes that his reading of 
the justices' careers is "not contradicted by other aspects of their 
"' John B. Minor Professor of Law and Professor of History, University of Virginia. B.A. 
1963, Amherst College; M.A. 1964, Ph.D. (American Studies) 1967, Yale University; J.D. 1970, 
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lives," he does "not undertake to prove [his] proposition by exhaustive 
citation" (p. 3). Rather, Burt is concerned with a theme which, he 
appears to suggest, has been vital in his own life; he has projected this 
theme onto the lives of Brandeis and Frankfurter; and he has drawn 
lessons from the lives of those justices that have enriched his own. 
Thinking that his theme has wide applicability, he invites the rest of us 
to engage in a comparable exercise. This tone seems consistent with 
an invitation to read Two Jewish Justices as an idiosyncratic, but none-
theless evocative, interpretation of the lives of two resonant figures in 
the history of American law. 
But at other times Burt takes a much more ambitious tone. At the 
same point in his narrative when he underscores the selective and 
speculative nature of his account, he states that the experiences of 
Brandeis and Frankfurter have "contemporary nieariing" and "direct 
relevance" to "issues confronted today by all judges in America, and 
by all Americans, whether Jews or gentiles" (p. 3). He asserts that the 
central meaning of "Jewishness" in America has been "outsider sta-
tus" and "homelessness," and that outsider status "is pervasively ex-
perienced in American society today - not simply among those 
groups customarily conceived in this way, such as blacks or Jews, but 
generally" (p. 3). He attempts to provide conventional academic doc-
umentation for these assertions in the course of his narrative. 1 And he 
concludes that the careers of Brandeis and Frankfurter teach all of us 
a lesson: that "the distinction between denizen of a safe haven [in-
sider] and despised outcast [outsider] is not invariably and assuredly 
settled." "[N]o one in America," he claims, "can avoid acknowledg-
ing this lesson, this starting place for charting a social and personal 
course" (p. 128). 
At this point one can begin to grasp how intensely parables test the 
boundaries of contemporary legal scholarship. Read in its more ambi-
tious form, Burt's book becomes an example of theoretical and specu-
lative scholarship so exalted in its claims as to become incapable of 
evaluation within the conventional parameters of scholarly discourse. 
In this fashion, the author's persona in Two Jewish Justices becomes 
the persona of the omnicompetent law professor, passing off "selec-
tive" spe_culation for scholarship and equating arrogance with compe-
tence. One need not adopt that reading; one can treat Burt's 
contribution as a parable in the more modest sense of the term. But 
then one is left to wonder what purpose the scholarly apparatus of 
Two Jewish Justices serves. 
II 
Burt's parable begins with his arrival as a law student at Yale in 
I. E.g. pp. 68-76. 
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1962, where he "felt somehow that [he] had found a home." One rea-
son for this feeling, he later concluded, was that "there were a consid-
erable number of Jews among my classmates." Burt was "startled," 
but at the same time comforted, "by this sudden experience of being so 
much surrounded by Jews in a place other than a synagogue." Six 
years later, when Burt entered law teaching, he "felt almost at once 
that this career choice was the right one," and again "noticed the con-
siderable concentration of Jews among my teaching colleagues." 
Eventually, in 1976, Burt returned to Yale as a faculty member, and 
"was particularly struck by the fact that almost half my colleagues ... 
were Jewish" (p. 1). By the time he came to write the lectures that 
developed into Two Jewish Justices, Burt had resolved "to try to un-
derstand why I and so many other Jews of my generation have found a 
home in America as lawyers, and in particular as law teachers" (p. 2). 
The lives of Brandeis and Frankfurter came to be bound up in that 
effort. To Burt, they represented "two Jews who attained great promi-
nence at a time when the American legal profession generally was in-
hospitable to Jews" (p. 2). But the cultural atmosphere in which Burt 
undertook his examination of Brandeis and Frankfurter was one, he 
felt, in which "Jews ... are much more welcome in the profession"; 
indeed one in which Burt found an "unprecedented hospitality to Jews 
in the legal profession generally, and in law teaching specifically" (pp. 
2-3). Burt thus came to ponder the fact that "the example of [Bran-
deis and Frankfurter] did not immediately translate ... into an under-
standing of the contemporary role of Jews in the legal profession" (p. 
2). 
Out of Burt's efforts to link the lives of two Jewish justices to his 
own experiences as a contemporary Jew emerged the central theme of 
his parable. Brandeis and Frankfurter, he concluded, associated Jew-
ishness "with outsider status, with homelessness." They were exam-
ples of the "paradigmatic diaspora Jew," engaged in a "quest for a 
home, some secure resting place" (p. 5). For his own generation, Burt 
concluded, the lesson of that vision is centered in the place of "home-
lessness," or "outsider status," in contemporary America: 
I came to the conclusion that outsider status, homelessness, is perva-
sively experienced in American society today - not simply among those 
groups customarily conceived in this way, such as blacks or Jews, but 
generally; and that this generalized experience both explains the easier 
contemporary acceptance of Jews in America and points to possible fu-
ture dangers for Jews, for blacks, for other minorities, for all Americans. 
[p. 3] 
Already, at this very early point in Burt's story, the structure of 
the parable is in place. Jews, a dispossessed people, are defined by 
their homelessness, their perpetual outsider status. Brandeis and 
Frankfurter, being Jewish justices, necessarily were forced to come to 
terms with their outsider status and to engage in a quest for a profes-
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sional home. Burt, however, is conscious of not having had to engage 
in such a quest. He has "found a home" as a law student and a law 
professor, in important part because of his sense that many of his peers 
are Jewish and thus that the profession oflaw teaching is hospitable to 
Jews. 
But in Burt's view this "hospitality" has not principally been a 
product of "the relevance of the Jewish talmudic tradition" to law 
teaching or to "the special reliance by [the] parents and grandparents 
[of Jews] on professional education as a vehicle for assimilation in 
America" (p. 2). Nor does he suggest that the hospitable climate is a 
consequence of increased tolerance on the part of non-Jews or a prod-
uct of the revulsion toward anti-Semitism in the face of the example of 
Hitler's Germany. Instead, the hospitality is a product of the realiza-
tion among many contemporary Americans that they are themselves 
"homeless" outsiders. Identification with "homelessness," then, be-
comes the explanatory theme that links the lives of Brandeis and 
Frankfurter with that of Burt, and indeed with those of all of us. 
With his structure established, Burt ranges through biography, his-
tory, sociology, and constitutional doctrine, all in the service of his 
homelessness theme. He begins with a characterization of Brandeis. 
Brandeis is portrayed as "standing alone at the margin of his society," 
accepting his Jewishness (principally through a commitment to the Zi-
onist movement), but eschewing "opportunities ... to find some com-
fortable communal affiliation and an 'insider's' status" (p. 9). Burt 
finds "this solitary stance" to be "a defining characteristic of virtually 
every facet of Brandeis' life" (p. 9), from his definition of his profes-
sional role as an attorney ("a position of independence - between the 
wealthy and the people, prepared to curb the excesses of either"2) to 
his effort as a Supreme Court justice to occupy "the boundary between 
[insider and outsider], speaking as advocate for the outsider and work-
ing to dissolve the boundary" (p. 36). 
In pursuit of this characterization of Brandeis, Burt stresses the 
"identification with the oppression and suppressed rage of homeless 
Jews" that allegedly motivated Brandeis to "instinctively underst[and] 
and identif[y] with ... oppressed outsiders" (p. 34). In support of 
these claims he quotes extensively from an unpublished dissent in 
Coronado Coal Company v. United Mine Workers 3 in which Burt finds 
"a passion and a biting anger on behalf of the disfavored outsiders" (p. 
29). At the same time, however, Burt maintains that Brandeis "was 
obviously separated from outsiders by his wealth and status. In this 
2. P. 10. This language is from an address Brandeis delivered in 1905, reprinted in L. BRAN-
DEIS, BUSINESS - A PROFESSION 337 (1917). 
3. 268 U.S. 295 (1925). Upon reargument, the Court unanimously adopted the position 
Brandeis had argued in dissent prior to rehearing. Brandeis' original unpublished dissent is re-
printed in A. BICKEL, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS 0 0F MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS 84-91 (1957). 
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sense ... he was neither insider nor outsider, but occupied a singular 
social space between the two" (p. 35). 
Later in his narrative Burt returns to Brandeis, and adds an addi-
tional dimension to his portrait. Brandeis' sense of social marginality, 
Burt suggests, translated itself into a "generalized principle" of con-
duct for Supreme Court justices. That principle was to use the judicial 
power "to obviate [the] social distinction between insider and out-
sider" in American society (pp. 85-86). In Burt's view: 
Brandeis tried, though without explicit acknowledgment, to carve a dif-
ferent social space for himself that confounded the distinction between 
insider and outsider. He did not thereby attempt to become an insider. 
Nor did he accept the continued existence of the social status of outsider 
.... Brandeis implicitly sought instead to dissolve the distinction. When 
Brandeis saw an outsider as such, he would strive to interpret this out-
sider's needs and concerns to the insiders of the day, to dissolve social 
boundaries by inspiring sympathy and fellow feeling on both sides. His 
role ... was to stand at the boundary of insider status and work toward 
its dissolution. [p. 87] 
In Burt's analysis Brandeis' role as a Supreme Court justice became a 
projection of his role as a Jew: a homeless, marginal individual who 
becomes an "insider," but rather than identifying with his new status, 
seeks to undermine it by dramatizing the existence of other "home-
less" groups in society and suggesting that their outsider status is for-
tuitous and ephemeral. 
One can readily see how this portrait fits the larger structure of 
Burt's parable. Brandeis, being an immigrant Jew, was one of the nu-
merous individuals who were "homeless" in American society. But he 
eventually exchanged his "outsider" status for affluence, professional 
success, and eventually historic prominence as the first Jew to sit on 
the Supreme Court. In this sense Brandeis became a quintessential 
"insider." Yet far from subordinating himself in his acquired "in-
sider" status, he remained a person at the margin of social respectabil-
ity, something of a maverick on the Court.4 He regarded his mission, 
according to Burt, as one of dissolving the boundaries between insider 
and outsider status by awakening insiders, such as his fellow Justices, 
to the plight of outsiders (p. 36). 
Two preliminary comments about Burt's interpretation of Bran-
deis seem in order at this point. First, there is something overly neat 
about the fit between Burt's interpretation of Brandeis' response to 
"homelessness" as a justice and Burt's interest in underscoring the 
pervasive "homelessness" in contemporary American society. One 
has the sense that complexities are being swept away in the pursuit of 
a single-minded theme. Second, in the passage quoted above in which 
4. Burt cites a conversation in which Brandeis, after noting that the Coronado Coal case had 
been reargued and that the Court had adopted Brandeis' position, said to his confidant Felix 
Frankfurter, "They will take it from Taft but wouldn't take it from me." P. 32. 
May 1989) Parable as Legal Scholarship 1513 
Burt characterizes Brandeis' "principle" of conduct as a Justice, he 
notes that Brandeis pursued his goals "without explicit acknowledg-
ment" of them. Burt, in short, is not offering any direct evidence that 
Brandeis believed in the goals Burt attributes to him. The relationship 
between interpretation and evidence in Two Jewish Justices requires 
further discussion, but such discussion seems best postponed until the 
remainder of Burt's narrative is set forth. 
Burt next turns to Felix Frankfurter. He introduces his analysis of 
Frankfurter's career with the statement that "Brandeis'[ ] self-con-
scious marginality is not the only social role conceivable for an Ameri-
can Jew or for a Jewish justice on the United States Supreme Court" 
(p. 36). For Burt, Frankfurter represents a vivid ex~ple of another 
role, that of the outsider who immerses himself in the values and trap-
pings of insider status, seeking thereby to disengage himself from his 
"homeless" past. Burt claims that Frankfurter, who unlike Brandeis 
was raised as a practicing Jew and for whom "Jewishness was inextri-
cably linked to the immigrant world in which he had been raised," 
needed "to separate himself from his immigrant past" in order to "be-
come a full-fledged American" (p. 39). As a result Frankfurter vigor-
ously embraced the English language, "national institutions" such as 
the Supreme Court, public education, Harvard, Franklin Roosevelt, 
American citizenship, saluting the flag, and democratic theory (pp. 39-
44). In the terms of Two Jewish Justices, Frankfurter "derived a man-
date zealously to protect the values and status of insiders, such as he 
had become" (p. 46). 
But "as much as Frankfurter strove to portray himself in this in-
sider's status," Burt argues, "it was never comfortably his" (p. 48). 
Burt points to Frankfurter~s becoming "unaccustomedly isolated" on 
the Supreme Court, partly as a result of the unwillingness of his col-
leagues to accept his views and partly from his own "perverse willful-
ness" in responding to disagreement with a "vitriolic anger toward his 
brethren" (pp. 48-49). He also points to two incidents in which 
Frankfurter, despite his apparent acceptance into elite "insider" cir-
cles as a visiting professor at Oxford and a Supreme Court justice, was 
embarrassed at his initial encounters with his new colleagues because 
he had not dressed properly. "Here was Frankfurter, at last eligible to 
dress up," Burt comments, "and he wore the wrong outfit" (p. 61). 
For Burt the incidents are evidence that "[s]omewhere in this intricate 
minuet, Frankfurter had lost his bearings" (p. 61). 
Thus Frankfurter appears, in the parable of Two Jewish Justices, as 
one who in "[h]is wish to achieve insider status, to find a home and an 
end to his personal exile, ... lost an essential aspect of his judgmental 
capacity; he became too singleminded, an overeager apologist for the 
existing order" (p. 60). He is portrayed as the classic ''parvenu": "al-
ways charming, cajoling, seducing the widest possible circle of admir-
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ers, but never quite successful in finding the right chord, always 
somewhat strident, always a bit gauche" (p. 62). Having been 
summed up, Frankfurter virtually disappears from Burt's narrative, 
reappearing only briefly as a holdout against the Warren Court's con-
cern with protecting minorities, a judge who "was prepared to see 
himself as the obedient instrument of national power" and who re-
jected any alternative conception of judging that "demand[ed] an in-
dependent - that is to say alienated, outcast - perspective on all 
exercise of authoritative power" (Pp. 101-02). 
Here again this interpretation of Frankfurter seems too monolithic 
and too neatly complementing Burt's general thesis. Frankfurter is 
the foil for Brandeis: the homeless Jew who, in his desperate search to 
find a home, loses his bearings, and becomes an apologist for an in-
sider status he never quite achieves - a parvenu. Just as Brandeis' 
aloofness and dogmatism5 appear as a "rigor[ous] stance alone and 
apart from others" (p~ 13) or "an extraordinary self-confidence in 
one's own rectitude and disinterestedness" (p. 10), qualities in Frank-
furter that others described as "overflowing gaiety and spontaneity 
which conveyed the impression of great natural sweetness"6 appear as 
"cajoling, . . . always somewhat strident, always a bit gauche." The 
reader of the parable is supposed to admire Brandeis for his "rigorous 
solitude" and his "conception of himself as . . . speaking as advocate 
for the outsider and working to dissolve the boundary" (pp. 35-36), 
and to feel contempt for Frankfurter's futile "struggle[ ] against ac-
knowledging his outcast status" (p. 129). 
The characterization of Brandeis and Frankfurter offered in Burt's 
narrative engenders suspicion not only because of its one-dimensional 
qualities, but also because it is not based on the kind of evidence con-
ventionally associated with efforts to recreate the attitudes of historical 
figures. With rare exceptions, Burt does not base his interpretation of 
Brandeis' and Frankfurter's different attitudes toward their ethnic her-
itage, or their different conceptions of their role as judges, on their 
own direct testimony.7 His technique is rather to present indirect evi-
5. Dean Acheson, one of Brandeis' Jaw clerks, described an incident in which Brandeis lec· 
tured Professor Manley Hudson on the "unbroken, continuous, and consistent" nature of moral-
ity, which Brandeis felt was the equivalent of "truth." Acheson commented that "if some of 
[Brandeis'] admirers knew him better they would like him less." D. ACHESON, MORNING AND 
NOON 95-96 (1965). 
6. P. 37. Burt quotes Isaiah Berlin from I. BERLIN, PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 84 (1981). 
7. Burt indicates that he "read through [Brandeis' and Frankfurter's] opinions, their biogra· 
phies, their extra judicial writings, and other sources" in researching the book. P. 2. His citations 
come from a variety of such sources. But none of his citations offers any direct evidence, from 
the writings of Brandeis or Frankfurter, that the former viewed his role as a judge as breaking 
down the boundaries between outsider and insider status, or that the latter viewed his role as 
maintaining and defending the insider/outsider distinction. In addition, none of Burt's citations 
offers any evidence that Brandeis or Frankfurter identified their status as Jews with the condition 
of being "homeless." The closest approximation to that kind of evidence Burt presents is a letter 
Frankfurter wrote to Henry Stimson in 1916 in which he said that "[i]t is not comfortable to be 
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dence, such as Brandeis' high regard for the value of privacy or his 
passion on behalf of striking workers, or Frankfurter's deference to 
legislation imposing compulsory flag salutes or stripping persons of 
citizenship for military desertions. He then extrapolates from this evi-
dence the judicial roles he attributes to Brandeis and Frankfurter, and 
then further extrapolates from their differing roles the proposition that 
Brandeis retained, as a judge, a sense of the margin'ali.ty and "home-
lessness" he felt as a Jew, whereas Frankfurter sought to suppress that 
sense of marginality by embracing "insider" .values._ 
Thus, in the portions of Burt's narrative dealing with the careers of 
Brandeis and Frankfurter, the reader is presented, with a strikingly at-
tenuated scholarly argument._ Burt begins with a proposition that 
Jews, in America and elsewhere, are "homeless'! persons. Since Bran-
deis and Frankfurter were both Jewish, they were ,necessarily home-
less. He then uses the indirect evidence described abqve in the service 
of a claim that Brandeis developed a stance toward the question of 
"insider" /"outsider" interaction in America that, placed him in a posi-
tion of social marginality, neither insider nor outsider, from which he 
sought to dissolve the distinctions between the two statuses. Using 
similar sorts of evidence, he then makes a ~omparable claim that 
Frankfurter developed quite a different stance, one characterized by 
social ingratiation, in the manner of a parvenu, and by resolute de-
fense, as a judge, of the distinction between insiders and outsiders. 
The argument is atten~ated because Bqrt not only presents precious 
little evidence that Br~ndeis or Frankfurter identified being Jewish 
with being "homeless," he presents no evidence that they conceived of 
their role as judges in terms of the "insider" /"outsider" status distinc-
tion that Burt posits as crucial to their stances. -Moreover, other evi-
dence exists, the presence of which Burt acknowledges, suggesting that 
on some occasions Brandeis appeared indifferent to outsiders in his 
opinions, and on some occasions Frankfurter appeared supportive of 
outsiders. 8 Burt's argument does not, in fact, function as a conven-
politically homeless." But the sentence preceding that comment read, "I have to be one of those 
who, by being outside of both camps, is going to pick and choose from election to election,'' and 
was written at a time when Frankfurter was more enthusiastic about the Progressive Party, 
which had run Theodore Roosevelt for President in 1912 and was running a candidate again in 
1916, than either the Republican or Democratic parties. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Henry 
L. Stimson (Nov. 2, 1916), quoted at p. 40. 
8. Burt states: 
As acute as Brandeis' appreciation was for the predicament of the outsider ... , and as 
powerfully as he gave voice to this perspective in his judicial work, Brandeis did not extend 
this understanding or conceive this judicial role on behalf of black peQple. On the occasions 
when the Court addressed the status of blacks, Brandeis remained silent; he joined, for ex-
ample, in the unanimous decisions reaffirming the constitutionality of segregated education 
and interstate transportation facilities. 
P. 84. 
He also concedes that during the Warren Court Frankfurter "[o]ccasionally ... would join 
with the majority to advance some increased protection for an 'outcast' claimant,'' but "never 
with the passion" of other members of the Warren Court majorities. P. 97. Ii is hard to know 
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tional scholarly argument at all, although it bears the apparatus of 
scholarship. It functions more as an idiosyncratic effort to interpret 
the career of two prominent justices in terms that the narrator finds 
personally compelling. 
III 
Burt's argument in the remainder of Two Jewish Justices proceeds 
in the same idiosyncratic vein. After advancing his characterizations 
of Brandeis and Frankfurter, Burt does not seek to offer additional 
detail that might complicate or deepen his portraits, nor to engage in a 
detailed analysis of how Brandeis' and Frankfurter's versions of being 
a "Jewish justice" played out in their opinions. Instead he begins an 
even more extended extrapolation of his central themes. The effect on 
a reader seeking to evaluate the book in terms of the ordinary canons 
of academic scholarship can only be described as breathtaking. 
Burt's first step in his extrapolation is to return to the issue of "the 
current concentration of Jews on American law school faculties" (p. 
64). Elaborating on earlier observations, he links this phenomenon 
not to the "full assimilation of Jews, the virtual ending of their out-
sider status," but to the "continuation of a special social role for Jews, 
... the high status outsider" (p. 65). American Jews will not "shake 
loose from outsider status," Burt claims, because "[t]his sense of alien 
status, of homelessness ... pervades American social life." Homeless-
ness, then, "has become the only social status truly available in Ameri-
can society," and "Jews are specially sensitized to this status" (p. 67). 
The reason that Jews have "received such ready entry into American 
law faculties" in recent times is that an "implicit awareness . . . has 
grown within the American legal academy that Jews, by virtue of their 
historic experience, are specially adept at understanding and con-
structing social rules based on the fundamental fact that insider status 
is barred to them" (pp. 67-68). 
The reader may be perplexed at this point, wondering how one 
might assemble evidence to confirm or to refute such a proposition. In 
Burt's argument, hospitability to Jews seems to rest not only on an 
"implicit awareness" about what Jewish candidates for law teaching 
would be "specially adept" at, but on the premise that "constructing 
social rules" from the perspective of the "high status outsider" is what 
law teachers regard as their chief function. These characterizations of 
law teaching, and the role of Jews within it, seem novel, at the least, 
and since Burt offers no evidence, the characterizations are difficult to 
treat as anything but unsupported assertions. 
Nonetheless Burt plunges ahead, next maintaining that "insider 
how Burt is able to divine Frankfurter's lack of passion for outsiders merely from the fact that he 
joined majority opinions. 
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status in America" has been "eroded" (p. 68). He recapitulates Amer-
ican history from the "founding days of the Republic" (p. 68) to the 
1980s, taking up relations between blacks and whites, men and wo-
men, and other groups whose interplay demonstrates for him that de-
spite efforts on the part of various "insiders" to cement or to preserve 
their status, "no one in America today is able to perceive himself or 
herself in social terms except as a homeless outsider" (p. 77). It fol-
lows from this historical survey that "what had seemed exceptional, 
even paradoxical, in Brandeis' or Frankfurter's time ... has ... now 
become the rule" (p. 77). No matter that this survey is remarkably 
swift and assertive, or that it could also be read to look less like the 
inexorable erosion of insider status than the successive emergence in 
American society of minorities whose claims are taken seriously by 
majorities at different points in time. The latter reading would suggest 
that insider status has endured, although the attitudes of insiders to 
specific groups of outsiders may have changed. But Burt is not in-
clined to linger over such complexities. · 
Having concluded that "outcast" status has become the norm, 
Burt then shifts his focus from the history of minorities to the jurispru-
dence of the Warren and Burger Courts. He finds, consistent with his 
claim that "the outcast in power is the·modal embodiment of authority 
in our time" (p. 77), that the Warren Court majority was a "Jewish" 
Court - a Court that sought, in decisions such as Brown v. Board of 
Education, 9 "to repudiate the pattern of social authority based on the 
rigid imposition of insider/outsider status" (p. 93). The examples 
Burt provides for this characterization of the Court's throw his meth-
odology in Two Jewish Justices into sharp relief. He suggests that the 
Warren Court majority "reiterated Brandeis' general stance" toward 
judging, and he points to two "specific links to Brandeis' position" (p. 
97). The first of these is the Court's discovery, in Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 10 of the constitutional right of privacy, whose common law ver-
sion Brandeis had embraced earlier in his career.11 For Burt this 
action of the Warren Court signifies its "embrace of Brandeis' [com-
mitment to] 'retreat from the world ... [for] solitude and privacy'" 
(pp. 97-98). The second link is, for Burt, "less overt, but of more per-
vasive significance" (p. 98). It is the Court's decision in Trop v. Dul-
les, 12 invalidating on eighth amendment grounds a federal statute 
stripping of citizenship any member of the armed forces convicted of 
wartime desertion. 
The first "link" is somewhat cryptic, since the "Brandeisian per-
9. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
10. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
11. Burt cites Brandeis' celebrated article, written with his then law partner Charles Warren, 
The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1S90). 
12. 356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
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spective" Burt finds "dominant in the work of the Warren Court" (p. 
103) is not simply a mirroring of Brandeis' interest in standing apart 
from others in the world, but an affirmative embrace of the claims of 
"outcasts" and outsiders. It is hard to see how enhanced attention to 
privacy values has anything to do with dissolving the boundaries be-
tween insider and outsider status; a concern for privacy would seem to 
extend to that of insiders as well as outsiders. The "link" Burt cites 
seems to be more revealing of the attenuated quality of his arguments 
than of anything else. 
The second '~link," involving Trop v. Dulles, calls forth a more ex-
tended discussion from Burt and, as such, provides more clues into his 
methodology. He begins by claiming that the "Court majority" in 
Trop "not only excoriated state imposition of outcast status; it did so 
on the basis of a virtually explicit empathic identification with the op-
pressed status of European Jews" (p. 98). He then suggests that "none 
of this [identification] was openly avowed in Trop," although "it seems 
to have been clearly understood ... by all of the justices writing in the 
case" (p. 98). The basis of this suggestion is Chief Justice Warren's 
statement, in his plurality opinion, that when citizenship is stripped 
from a person "the expatriate has lost the right to have rights." 13 
Warren relied for that proposition, according to Burt, on "an analysis 
by Hannah Arendt of the German legal regime that led to the extermi-
nation of the Jews" (p. 98). 
Burt documents this reliance on Arendt in th~ following fashion. 
He admits that Warren "did not cite [Arendt's] work as such" (p. 98). 
He argues, however, that Warren relied on Arendt because his opinion 
in Trop cited a dissenting opinion by Chief Judge Charles Clark of the 
Second Circuit, whose decision in Trop the Supreme Court had re-
viewed. Clark's opinion had cited a 1955 student Comment in the 
Yale Law Journal 14 that had characterized expatriation as "a loss of 
the right to have rights," quoting Arendt. Having thus satisfied him-
self that "the provenance of [Warren's] phrase is ... clear," Burt then 
considers why Arendt remained "unacknowledged" by Warren. "It is 
as if," Burt suggests, "Warren were unwilling directly to draw the 
links that he saw between the challenged congressional act [in Trop] 
and the Nazi treatment of ,Tews" (p. 99). 
Burt's. analysis of the Arendt reference is characteristic of his ap-
proach to the relationship between evidence and argument throughout 
Two Jewish Justices. Having advanced a broad characterization - in 
this example, the Warren Court majority as a "Jewish Court" linked 
to Brandeis in its sympathy for outcasts - Burt then offers evidence 
that at first glance appears to be of a conventional sort, treated in a 
conventional fashion, such as passages from Supreme Court opinions 
p. 356 U.S. at 102. 
14. Com_ment, The Expatriation Act of 1954, 64 YALE L.J. 1164 (1955). 
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whose text is cited. But on further examination neither Burt's evi-
dence nor his interpretations of it are conventional. Indeed, the Trop 
example offers no direct evidence that Warren relied on Arendt at all. 
Warren cited only Clark's dissent, making no reference to the student 
comment, let alone Arendt. Burt, however, finds significance in this 
omission. In Burt's interpretation Warren is fully conscious of Arendt 
and fully conscious of the parallels between congressional treatment of 
wartime deserters and Nazi treatment of Jews, but suppresses making 
the parallel explicit because "the parallel would not sit comfortably 
with the members of Congress who voted for the expatriation mea-
sure" (p. 99). For Burt, not only is the "linkage" between Warren's 
opinion and the Arendt analysis of the extermination of the Jews 
"plainly there," even if "partially hidden, encoded" (p. 99), but the 
link between the Warren Court's stance in Trop and Brandeis' general 
stance as a judge is also plain. 
At this point it should be clear how Burt's methodology presses 
the limits of conventional legal scholarship. The relationship between 
the structure of Burt's parable and the evidence he presents in support 
of his general propositions is a parody of the conventional scholarly 
relationship between the structure of an argument and the supporting 
documentation. The evidence Burt presents is so overwhelmed by the 
structure of his argument that even when he has no direct evidence in 
support of one of his general propositions, he offers other kinds of 
evidence, extracts the meaning of that evidence based on its consis-
tency with the propositions themselves, and then argues that the very 
indirectness of the evidence reinforces the propositions. It is as if any 
evidence will do; what counts is the structure of the parable. Hence 
the "lessons" of Two Jewish Justices are not drawn from evidence in-
dependent of the parable's structure: the reader is to treat the para-
ble's narrative as so meaningful that its narrator's interpretations are 
taken as necessarily plausible. 
' In the last chapter of Two Jewish Justices Burt attempts to gather 
up the loose ends of his parable to highlight its central message. After 
suggesting that the Warren Court, for at least part of its history, was a 
"Jewish Court" of the Brandeisian variety, Burt then claims that after 
1967 the Court was motivated primarily by "underlying fears about 
the widespread urban race riots of the mid 1960s and popular resist-
ance to the Vietnam War" (pp. 106-07). It thus retreated to a ''par-
venu" perspective, one "more fearful of challenges to constituted 
social authority" and "less· confident that [high] social status ... 
would receive widespread unforced acknowle,dgment and deference" 
(p. 107). He cites as evidence the Burger Court's tentative embrace of, 
and then retreat from, constitutional invalidation of the death penalty. 
For Burt those designated for public executions represent an "outcast 
class" (p. 113), and the Court's eventual validation of death penalty 
1520 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 87:1508 
statutes in Gregg v. Georgia and its companion cases15 signify a deci-
sion "to regard the maintenance of distinctly bounded outcast classes 
as intrinsically justified" (p. 113). 
Burt then returns to Brandeis, who he claims "was not deflected by 
fears of turmoil from his solicitude for outcasts as such" (p. 114). 
Brandeis' "basic goal" as a judge, for Burt, 
was to work toward a resolution of social conflict that would transcend 
the terms of that conflict, that would render irrelevant the contending 
parties' self-conceptions as insiders or outsiders. . . . His goal was to 
resolve social conflict, not to foment it. . . . [H]e was ... convinced that 
imposed order would not yield social peace if that order merely ratified 
the existing, chafing distinctions between insider and outsider. [p. 116] 
Having characterized Brandeis as a judge who "persisted in his sym-
pathy for outsiders, notwithstanding either the provocations of their 
disruptive conduct or the opportunities offered by his own social at-
tainments . . . to define himself as an insider" (p. 117), Burt seeks to 
remind the reader once again where this perspective of Brandeis 
originated. The depth of Brandeis' commitment to outcasts, for Burt, 
was "the meaning that Brandeis forged from Judaism" (p. 117). 
At this point Burt is nearly ready to make the lesson of his parable 
explicit. He has one last step, to underscore the fact that Brandeis, 
unlike Frankfurter, was from a financially secure and highly educated 
family and thus "enjoyed a luxury ... of vicarious, more than direct, 
experience of alienation" (p. 124). He was a "comfortable" outcast, if 
an outcast still. His identification with outcast status was thus "vivid, 
but not daunting"; he "had an unshakable conviction that its difficul-
ties could not only be borne but transcended" (p. 122). Brandeis' ex-
perience as a Jew was thus like "the contemporary generation of 
American Jews,'' for whom "bondage is a vicarious, rather than di-
rect, experience." Contemporary American Jews, for Burt, are like 
Brandeis in not having been "scarred by the pervasive anti-Semitism 
that their parents confronted" (pp. 126-27). Thus, paradoxically, con-
temporary Jews are in a better position to identify with outcasts, since 
they have less reason to deny their outcast status in search of accept-
ance into the community of insiders. They are in a position to elect 
Brandeis' posture toward their heritage and toward outcasts generally. 
But at the same time Burt assigns to contemporary Jews, indeed to 
"most Americans," the characteristics he found in Frankfurter: a ten-
dency to "idolatrous self-worship,'' and to "turning away from any 
identification with outcasts" (p. 127). The lesson of Two Jewish Jus-
tices is thus to follow Brandeis' rather than Frankfurter's example. In 
the parable one justice "struggle[s] against acknowledging his outcast 
15. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Profitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. 
Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisi-
ana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976). 
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status, but vainly," whereas the other "embrace[s] homelessness as his 
heritage, and ... [draws] strength from it" (p. 129). Those who are 
currently comfortable in their roles in American life need to eschew 
the path of "forced suppression of doubts about the fairness or ration-
ality of the fixed boundary between insider and outcast status" (p. 
129). That path "promises no reliable social peace. Nor does it offer 
personal repose" (p. 129). But because we are all outcasts, we need, 
with Brandeis, to recognize that fact and act upon it. 
IV 
I have set forth the structure of Burt's parable in some detail, with 
considerable attention to Burt's own language, in order to underscore 
how firmly its message rests on the inner terminology and logic of his 
narrative. The successive generalizations that Burt advanced are so 
embedded in the parable's structure, and the language he employs so 
interconnected, that a reader may forget that his crucial terms and 
concepts - homelessness, insider, outsider, outcast, parvenu, "Jew-
ish" and "Jewishness" - each stand for sociological and historical 
assertions that Burt has himself made, and documented through a 
highly unconventional use of evidence. Burt has claimed that Jewish-
ness is primarily linked to homelessness; that the maintenance of a 
shifting boundary between insider and outsider status has been a per-
petual theme of American history; that at bottom all Americans are 
outcasts; that only two social roles exist for Jews, "pariah," or outcast, 
and parvenu, or pseudo-insider; and that a person with a "Jewish" 
perspective is one who acknowledges an identification with outcast 
groups. These claims, taken together, yield an inevitable and perhaps 
powerful lesson, the lesson of his parable. But none of the claims, 
taken separately, amounts to anything more than speculation. The 
reader has to grant Burt's speculations a provisional validity to em-
brace the parable's lesson. 
With the highly speculative character of Burt's arguments in mind, 
one might advance the following analysis of the ".arious propositions 
that link Burt's narrative. Robert Burt, a person of Jewish anteced-
ents who had encountered comparatively little sense of professional or 
social discrimination, was given the occasion, by virtue of an opportu-
nity to lecture on the role of Jews in American law, to reflect on why 
he and "so many other Jews of my generation" had "foupd a home" in 
law teaching. His reflections were predicated on this feeling of being 
comfortable, of not being excluded from the "insider" status of hold-
ing a chair on the Yale Law School faculty by virtue of his being Jew-
ish. In the course of his reflections Burt considered the careers of 
Brandeis and Frankfurter, Jews who had also held high status posi-
tions in the legal profession, but whose careers had taken' place in a 
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period in which Jews were much more likely to be barred from high 
status positions solely because of their roots. 
In reconstructing their careers, Burt came to conceive the two men 
as representing contrasting attitudes toward the relationship between 
their ethnicity and their success. Frankfurter's attitude seemed exces-
sively obsequious towards traditional American insiders and exces-
sively preoccupied with the defense of insider attitudes and 
traditionalist institutions. Burt found it embarrassing in its apparent 
abandonment of ethnic identity and the lack of self-esteem that it re-
flected. Brandeis' attitude, by contrast, struck Burt as exceptionally 
preservationist of Brandeis' sense of self, strikingly detached from in-
sider culture, and, on examination, deeply mindful of ethnic origins 
and the outcast status that linked Brandeis, as a Jew, to other outsid-
ers. Burt, in short, admired Brandeis, was offended by Frankfurter, 
and chose to identify his own career progression with that of the for-
mer rather than the latter. 
Given Burt's posture, it was no accident that he was offended by 
Frankfurter's persistent embrace of insider values and traditionalist in-
stitutions, as well as by his self-conscious disclaimers of the relevance 
of his ethnic identity to his role as a judge. Burt's more positive reac-
tion to Brandeis was perhaps less inevitable, given evidence that Bran-
deis was selective in his solicitude for outcast groups and that 
Brandeis' temperament precluded his demonstrating any overt emo-
tional attachment to others. But Burt was attracted to Brandeis in any 
event, and was able, through attention to Brandeis' discovery of Zion-
ism in his middle years and the "passion" on behalf of outcasts ex-
pressed in one of Brandeis' unpublished dissents, to make Brandeis a 
foil for Frankfurter. 
Having established Brandeis as an alternative to Frankfurter, Burt 
then set out to confirm the superiority of Brandeis' example. He as-
serted that since all Americans see themselves at bottom as outcasts, 
dissolving the boundaries between insider and outsider status is a pol-
icy of paramount importance. He enlisted the Warren Court in this 
quest, and identified the quest with Brandeis and with a rediscovery of 
the central meaning of Jewishness. He recallei:J. Brandeis' rediscovery 
of his ethnic heritage in connection with Zionism, and compared the 
"comfortable" position from which Brandeis engaged in that redis-
covery with the comfortable position of most contemporary Jews. In 
short, Burt confirmed the patterns and choices of his own career. He 
and Brandeis did not let their high status blind them to their roots or 
to the position of outsiders in American life. He and Brandeis did not 
lose sight of their homelessness despite having found a home. He and 
Brandeis were aware that the possession of insider status did not obvi-
ate the fact that they, and all Americans, remained in a profound sense 
outsiders. He and Brandeis thus engaged in a joint effort, separated 
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only by the incidental features of time and professional role, to dis-
solve the boundaries between insiders and outsiders.16 
In this fashion, Two Jewish Justices becomes not only a parable, 
but a self-confirmatory one: a story whose central lesson for the 
reader is to choose the path of the narrator. Such a reading, of course, 
is based on very little evidence independent of the reader's intuition 
that Burt structured his examination of Brandeis and Frankfurter in 
the fashion outlined above. But since Burt's own examination of those 
careers can itself be reduced to a series of propositions resting essen-
tially on intuition, the reading does not seem inconsistent with the 
spirit in which Burt's parable is presented. 
One could, however, eschew the above analysis and read Burt's 
effort as a more informal, speculative venture, designed to provoke, 
intended to be a sort of personal memoir in which Brandeis, Frank-
furter, and the Warren and Burger Courts are enlisted. A parable is, 
after all, just a tale. But this reading of Two Jewish Justices runs up 
against two persistent features of the book. First is the tone of high 
moral seriousness, suggested in such phrases as "idolatrous self-wor-
ship," "escalating dynamic of repression and fear," "social peace," 
and "personal repose" (pp. 127-29). In such language Burt conveys an 
impression that his claim that "different attitudes toward outsider sta-
tus and homelessness have direct relevance to the issues confronted 
today by ... all Americans, whether Jews or gentiles" (p. 3), is a claim 
of great prescience and import. Second is the scholarly apparatus of 
Two Jewish Justices, which I have taken some pains to explore. De-
spite Burt's unconventional use of evidence, that apparatus is intended 
to suggest to the reader that Burt's parable is not merely impressionis-
tic, but authoritative. The narrator of the parable is to be taken not 
only as engaging and provocative, but as wise. 
v. 
Thus Two Jewish Justices ultimately asks its readers to consider the 
sources of authority in. the contemporary community of legal scholars. 
By treating the absence of evidence, imaginatively interpreted, as the 
16. Burt had previously identified the parables of the New Testament with a methodology 
designed to "convert[] all into needy outsiders by confounding insider and outsider and then 
offering hope for ultimate protection by mapping a path back inside for everyone." Burt, Consti-
tutional Law and the Teaching of the Parables, 93 YALE L.J. 455, 471 (1984). He described the 
method of the parables as 
first to command the attention of people who conceive themselves as safely inside some 
protective flock; then to persuade these people that they are no different from others visibly 
outside, even others whom they believe they have excluded from their own safe superiority; 
and finally, having provoked in these once-smug insiders feelings of vulnerability and conse-
quent emphatic identification with the old outsiders, to show how this empathy in itself can 
serve as the route for membership in a community that promises a more reliable, more 
secure haven. 
Id. at 478. 
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equivalent of evidence; by treating a highly structured story as the 
equivalent of history; by treating complex human actors as archetypes 
and foils; and by treating the parable as the equivalent of legal scholar-
ship, Burt raises the question of where "authoritative" readings of 
texts, of events, and of the lives of historical personages can be said to 
derive their authority. That question is particularly pressing for con-
temporary legal scholarship, which is increasingly perceived as taking 
place in a universe of discourse characterized by radical uncertainty 
and disagreement about the appropriate methodological groundings of 
scholarly work. 
One of the central areas of methodological debate among contem-
porary scholars involves the relationship between evidence and inter-
pretation. Reduced to its lowest terms, that debate centers on the 
question of whether it is possible to treat the evidence offered by a 
given scholarly interpretation as having any meaning independent of 
that interpretation. If evidence has no such independent meaning, a 
subsidiary question arises: how can one assess the worth of scholarly 
contributions other than by acknowledging the prominence of the in-
terpreter or by noting the concordance, or lack thereof, between the 
, interpreter's views and those of the reader? In a scholarly community 
of widely differing attitudes about methodological and substantive is-
sues, are there any common evaluative standards for assessing inter-
pretations? In particular, is there any common understanding of the 
role of evidence as a constraint on interpreters? 
Burt's presentation of evidence through the parable genre forces a 
reader to confront such questions. Burt's use of evidence, as noted, is 
highly unconventional, given the received expectations of post-World 
War II generations of scholars that evidence in a scholarly work 
sh,ould provide an independent basis on which to evaluate the interpre-
tations advanced in that work, as distinguished from being over-
whelmed by the work's interpretive framework. 17 It may be that in 
this age of radical disagreement about the appropriate relationship be-
tween "texts" and "interpreters," such expectations no longer exist, 
and it may be that the epistemological premise on which those expec-
tations rest - that evidence is capable of having an objective meaning 
that can be detached from the interpretive frameworks in which it is 
presented - is unintelligible. If one cannot say with confidence that 
evidence is a constraint on interpretation, then one of the principal 
bases for evaluating the worth of scholarly interpretations - was evi-
dence "fairly" presented; did an interpretation "conform to" rather 
than "distort" that evidence - disappears. 
17. This expectation has been communicated in the form of a "falsifiability principle": the 
propositions contained in a scholarly interpretation must rest on evidence that contains the seeds 
of their prospective "falsification" or revision. See K. POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTA-
TIONS 215-17, 228-31, 312-14 (3d ed. 1969). 
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At that point, with the evidence constraint rendered problematic, 
criteria for evaluating the worth of interpretations appear to locate 
themselves primarily in the "promise" of the interpretation itself. If, 
in the collective judgment of some relevant interpretive community, 
the questions in a work are stimulating, the answers provocative, and 
the discussion of issues presented in accessible and resonant language, 
the interpretation can be regarded as "promising" and thus worthy of 
attention. Given this community standard, the parable genre of inter-
pretation, as employed in Two Jewish Justices, would seem to contain 
considerable "promise." The questions Burt asks and seeks to answer 
are stimulating, his narrative is crafted in accessible and sophisticated 
prose, and the lessons of his parable are invested with a tone that con-
veys a sense of urgent moral seriousness. In a universe of scholarly 
discourse in which the possibility is taken seriously that interpreta- · 
tions necessarily overwhelm their "texts," who is to say that a parable, 
even if at bottom an impressionistic, idiosyncratic tale, has less claim 
to scholarly promise than any other genre? 
The last question seems capable of being addressed, if perhaps not 
definitively answered. There is something disquieting about an inter-
pretative effort that, while cloaking itself in a conventional scholarly 
apparatus, reveals itself, on closer inspection, to be employing that ap-
paratus as so much window dressing. There is something troubling 
about the assumption that highly personalized readings of history and 
of contemporary culture can be offered as candidates for authoritative 
status when the sources of their authority appear to rest solely on the 
intuitions of the author. In this vein, Two Jewish Justices is a book 
whose methodology not only conveys something about its author but 
about the scholarly universe in which he writes. It is as if the tacit 
message of the book is that, since there are no longer any intelligible 
criteria by which one can assess the validity of interpretations ad-
vanced in a work of scholarship, any interpretation - no matter how 
broad, no matter how unsubstantiated - is potentially promising. 
What counts in determining the worth of a scholarly work, in the end, 
is the stature of the scholar writing it and the stimulating quality of 
the narrative's prose, not the relationship between the interpretations 
offered in it and the evidence on which these interpretations rest. 
Had Two Jewish Justices appeared at a different point in the history 
of twentieth-century legal scholarship, its place in the scholarly uni.:. 
verse might have been far easier to discern. Were different working 
definitions of scholarship present, with clearer expectations about the 
"proper" reiationship between evidence and interpretation in a schol-
arly work, Two Jewish Justices could be treated as a parable without 
scholarly pretense.. It could be regarded as an effort that makes no 
claim of authoritativeness and that offers only an interesting tale, some 
provocative reflections, and, if one is engaged by the tale and the re-
flections, a lesson worthy of contemplation. But in the current world 
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of legal scholarship Two Jewish Justices appears as a much less mod-
est, indeed a pretentious effort, that seeks authoritativeness in spite of 
its disclaimers, that employs a conventional scholarly apparatus in 
pursuit of that authoritativeness, but abuses that apparatus in the pro-
cess, and that ultimately asks to be regarded as authoritative simply 
because of the stature of its author and the inherent interest of the 
issues it addresses. 
Two Jewish Justices, in sum, is a parable presented as legal scholar-
ship. As such it not ·only invites a consideration of the current sources 
of scholarly authority among contemporary legal academics, it raises 
an awkward series of questions that emerge from such consideration. 
Is it the case that in a profession marked by significant stratification 
and by a close relationship between status and the "influence" of ideas, 
high status "insiders" such as Burt are able to claim, and perhaps to 
secure, the status of authorities merely because of who they are? Have 
we reached a point in legal scholarship where, because of the obvious 
lack of coherence about what constitutes "good" scholarship or "ap-
propriate" genres for scholarly communication, any ruminations on 
any subjects, so long as conducted by high-status persons, deserve at-
tention? If so, it would seem that the parable genre can be regarded as 
the equivalent of any other scholarly genre, and that the "promise" of 
an interpretation and the status of the interpreter can be regarded as 
the touchstones for assessing authoritativeness and prominence. By 
inviting the possibility of such a conclusion, Two Jewish Justices holds 
up to those of us engaged in contemporary scholarship a disturbing 
image of ourselves. 
